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Abstract
Does Chevron deference face a “death by a thousand cuts?” Many believe
so, but few assess that claim with quantitative data. This thesis does. It
extends a database of all Supreme Court cases in which an agency interprets
a law, spanning 1600 cases from 1984 to the present. Then it investigates how
Chevron fares at the Supreme Court over time. Wielding whole population
statistics, it finds an unprecedented and recent decline in the rate at which
the Supreme Court defers under Chevron. Because the decline develops in
the last decade, it seems hasty to conclude Chevron approaches its doom.
Any of the following still seem plausible: the government soon wins a spree
of Chevron cases, the Court cabins Chevron once and for all, or the doctrine
settles into a new normal. Those outcomes depend on why Chevron faces
decline. While eliminating other explanations, the data suggests justices
could oppose Chevron, agencies could struggle more with their paperwork,
or the Court could disagree more with the government in general. Each has
its own implications for the administrative state.
1
1 Introduction
When Americans picture the government at work, they might remember I’m
Just a Bill from Schoolhouse Rock! In this animated short, Bill journeys
through Capitol Hill—a journey that takes him through the House, the Sen-
ate, and then to the President’s desk, where he must evade a veto. After
he does, a Congressman comments, “He signed you, Bill, and now you’re a
law!” The charming song ends there, and many believe Bill’s journey does
too.
That journey is “no more, if it ever was” (Gluck 2014, 611). Congress
writes vaguely. His key terms are ambiguous. After signing Bill, the President
might not know his unequivocal meaning, but suggests ways to implement
him nonetheless. Even if Congress does not write clear laws, the President
must execute them.
Imagine two reasonable people disagree on how to interpret Bill. Their
disagreement arrives in court. Now judges must parse Bill’s meaning. To do
so, they could use Chevron deference.
In 1984, just eight years after I’m Just A Bill first airs, the Supreme Court
decides Chevron. In that unanimous decision, the Court outlines a method
for choosing one of a bill’s many permissible interpretations. It requires
judges to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes.
Put simply, if Congress writes Bill ambiguously, and an agency interprets
him, then courts must agree with that agency.
Though Chevron might not appear earth-shattering, Justice Breyer and
leading academics call it “the undisputed admin law champion” (Breyer et
al. 2017, 256). With Chevron, agencies can interpret statutes across all kinds
of subjects. From transportation directives to health protections, back to
environmental regulations, and even to immigration law, agencies employ
Chevron to align ambiguous statutes with their regulatory ambitions. This
makes Chevron controversial at all levels of government.
Due to its controversy, many describe it as “in rough shape,” “under
siege,” and perhaps facing its “imminent demise” (Matz 2018). Maybe, to-
day, they are right. But similar descriptions surface in the 1990s, circulating
2
ever since. In law reviews, predicting Chevron’s death is a perennial favorite.
According to recent and comprehensive quantitative analysis, Chevron is
alive and well at the circuit courts. When the circuits use Chevron, agen-
cies prevail almost 80% of the time (Barnett and Walker 2017, 30). No one
recently, however, investigates Chevron at the Supreme Court in a similar
manner. Most of the literature is qualitative, not quantitative. The little
existing and recent quantitative literature follows Chevron at the Court for
ten years or less (Beerman 2014; Richardson 2021).
An older database offers a solution. Even today, people regard Eskridge
and Baer’s Continuum of Deference as “the most comprehensive study of
deference in the Supreme Court” (Barnett and Walker 2017, 18). From 1984
to 2006, it analyzes all Supreme Court cases in which agencies interpret a law.
This thesis extends that database through the 2019-2020 term. The ex-
tension hand-codes all statutory and regulatory interpretation cases from the
last decade and a half. Along the way, it picks up the Chevron cases over
that time. For each of those, the extension has two relevant measures: first,
whether the Court defers under Chevron; and second, whether the govern-
ment prevails.
These measures reveal two trends over time. First, the Court defers under
Chevron less often. And second, agencies lose more often in Chevron cases.
In the last five years, both trends accelerate. With a closer look, the Court
defers only once under Chevron since 2015. This does not prove Chevron will
soon die. But it does align with such predictions.
The predictions of Chevron’s demise often refer to a “death by a thou-
sand cuts.” According to this view, the Court excepts more cases at Chevron’s
steps. The exceptions eventually make Chevron so unwieldy that the worlds
with and without it look identical.
Some might ask, then, why the Court would carve up Chevron. From
some scattered dissents and concurrences over the last decade, it seems likely
that Chevron has enemies on the Court. Every year or two, Justices Thomas
and Gorsuch write that Chevron is unconstitutional. They always refuse to
defer. For the rest of the Court, invoking Chevron might feel like stepping
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on eggshells.
Instead of tearing up the doctrine, justices might not invoke Chevron
at all. People call this “Chevron avoidance.” To compromise with Justices
Thomas and Gorsuch, other members of the Court might rationalize their
opinions without Chevron. In that case, Chevron would not face a “death by
a thousand cuts.” Chevron would decline because of no cuts at all.
It is possible, though, that bad luck may explain Chevron’s poor health.
Throughout Trump’s tenure, the government does not fulfill regulatory law’s
requirements. People document that the Trump administration fares worse in
administrative law cases than his predecessors, and that lines up with most of
Chevron’s decline. Chevron might rebound during the Biden administration.
Or maybe it fits into a broader trend. At the Court, the government
loses more statutory and regulatory interpretation cases than ever before.
Lately, the government’s chances are not better than a coin flip. If the losses
continue in the Biden administration, then expect the Court to obstruct the
administrative state in general. That implicates policy outcomes far more
than Chevron ever could.
Speaking of which, people might overstate how much Chevron influences
the Court. With and without Chevron, the government wins at about the
same rate. This comparison suggests that if Chevron slowly passes on, it
might not matter at the Court. Still, most believe Chevron matters at the
circuit courts. So Chevron’s decline might influence regulatory law nation-




The original Chevron decision explains that courts should defer to an agency’s
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute. Today, people understand
this explanation as a two-step test. It goes as follows:
 Before the test begins, judges must except some statutes and agency
decisions. For some examples, judges may not use this test on criminal
statutes,1 and they should exclude agency interpretations that do not
carry the force of law. Expect more on these “step zero” exceptions
later.
 At step one, judges must find the statute “silent or ambiguous.” If the
statute speaks to “the specific issue at hand,” judges must scrutinize its
meaning with “traditional tools of statutory construction.” If it does
not, then judges must check if an agency interprets the statute. If one
does, then judges proceed to step two.
 At step two, judges must decide whether the agency’s interpretation is
“reasonable.” If they decide it is, then they cannot “substitute” their
“own construction” of the statute. Instead, they must interpret the
statute as the agency does.2
To the average American, Chevron might seem like mundane and boring
procedure. At the time, “no one” arguing the case would expect it to be-
come a “landmark” decision (Merrill 2014, 257). A few years and more than
a thousand citations later, people describe it as “one of the few defining”
modern Supreme Court decisions (Sunstein 1990, 2075).
1. See Crandon v. United States 494 US 152 (1990) (explaining that the Court “never
thought” the Department of Justice has the power to interpret criminal statutes).
2. Some dissent that Chevron should have only one step. According to them, the two
steps ask only a “single question”—whether the agency permissibly and authoritatively
interprets a statute (Stephenson and Vermeule 2009, 599). This is a normative question,
not a descriptive one. Most judges act as if Chevron has two steps, even if it should not.
And many treat the idea of “collapsing” Chevron’s two steps into one as “provocative”
(Bamberger and Strauss 2009, 612).
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Today, writing about Chevron deference “takes chutzpah” (Herz 2015,
1887). Chevron is among the most debated controversies in law. From a
count in 2017, federal courts and academia cite Chevron 14,000 times (Breyer
et al. 2017, 256). For scale, that outnumbers many landmark decisions by
a wide margin: Sum the citations of Brown v. Board, Roe v. Wade, and
Marbury v. Madison. Double it. Chevron is still cited more.
The literature is so deep that it is doubtful any person could read every
academic work about Chevron. To unpack Chevron’s history and debate its
desirability, some casebooks dedicate hundreds of pages. This literature re-
view cannot do justice to Chevron in the same way. For the sake of brevity,
it will summarize the debate.
Most of Chevron’s controversy hinges on whether it is constitutional. On
one side, people charge Chevron with conflicting with two articles in the Con-
stitution. In conflict with Article III, they describe Chevron as a “counter-
Marbury” decision (Sunstein 2006, 2589). According to them, Marbury v.
Madison dictates that only courts may interpret the law, yet Chevron re-
quires judges “abandon” this duty (Hamburger 2014, 316). In conflict with
Article II, Chevron takes away the power to write laws from Congress and
gives it to agencies. Congress abdicates its policy-making responsibility and
writes vague truisms into a statute, which then agencies rewrite into policy
decisions. In the 2010s, high-ranking government officials echo this argument.
Justices Thomas and Gorsuch ask the Court to cabin Chevron repeatedly.
Others make pleas to retain it (Scalia 1989, 516). And Congress considers the
Separations of Powers Restoration Act annually, written to restrict Chevron.
Others defend Chevron’s constitutionality. They respond that the Con-
stitution itself is just like an “ambiguous” statute (Siegel 2018, 972), and
the Court interpreted it in a way that permits agencies to interpret and
write rules. They return to colonial America to justify this constitutional in-
terpretation (Green 2020; Wurman 2020), which critics debate (Hamburger
2014). Or they respond, even assuming critics interpret the Constitution cor-
rectly, that the Court applies Chevron unconstitutionally in very few cases
and that overruling Chevron would “substantially undermine” constitutional
directives (Barnett 2020, 41). Of course, Chevron is not the only deference
doctrine, so these points predate Chevron by decades (Woodward and Levin
1979). Back-and-forth commentary continues today (Vermeule 2015; Ham-
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burger 2016).
A secondary controversy concerns Chevron’s policy implications. Above
all, people object that Chevron induces Congress to write “flabby, unclear
laws” (Cass 2016, 69). Others point out that Chevron may exacerbate policy
flip-flops between administrations (Pierce 2020). More contend that it should
be overruled because the Court applies it inconsistently, dissolving it “into
the mist” (Beerman 2014, 822). In response, people point out that overruling
Chevron would “upset hundreds of judicial decisions, thousands of statutory
provisions, and literally countless agency decisions” (Green 2019, 101). And
interviews suggests that legislative drafters do not consider Chevron a blank
check to write ambiguous laws (Gluck and Bressman 2013). At most, people
argue, the Court should “narrow” rather than end the doctrine (Hickman
and Nielson 2021, 931).
At the same time, some argue that if Chevron disappeared, the differ-
ence would be “marginal” (Pojanowski 2016, 1091). When considering the
Supreme Court, there is empirical consensus. Scholars observe that how
the Court applies Chevron depends on “an uncomfortable political compo-
nent” (Miles and Sunstein 2006, 870). Justices on the Supreme Court apply
Chevron “ideologically” (Eskridge and Raso 2020, 1793), deferring more of-
ten when they agree with the agency’s policy positions.
The consensus flips when considering the lower courts. As early as the
1990s, scholars argue that the circuit courts apply Chevron as “a mechanical
rule” (Kerr 1998, 59). In articles from both the past and present, they find
that the circuits usually do not wield Chevron “opportunistically” (Schuck
and Elliott 1990, 1035). These findings make for “compelling evidence” that
Chevron constrains judges from going rogue and substituting their polit-
ical beliefs in statutory interpretation (Barnett, Boyd, and Walker 2018,
1524). These judges may feel more held back by Chevron than justices on
the Supreme Court.
So Chevron matters, at least in the circuits. This study will not weigh in
on the normative debate about Chevron. Instead, it will catalog Chevron’s
history and mention its possible futures. But before that, it must discuss
Chevron’s cousins.
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Deference on a Continuum
Deference includes more than Chevron. When judges listen to an agency’s
advice and change their minds, that is deference. This thesis focuses on
canons outlining the conditions when judges should defer to an agency, which
are called deference regimes. The Court employs other deference regimes
before and during Chevron’s life. Eskridge and Baer organize all of them
into a “continuum” (Eskridge and Baer 2008, 1098). The continuum goes in
order of most to least deferential:
 Curtiss-Wright deference requires that judges defer to the executive’s
foreign policy decisions.
 Auer deference requires that judges defer to an agency’s reasonable
interpretation of its own ambiguous regulations.
 Chevron deference requires that judges interpret ambiguous statutes as
an agency reasonably does.
 Beth-Israel deference recommends that judges interpret ambiguous statutes
and treaties as an agency reasonably does.
 Skidmore deference recommends judges interpret the law as an agency
does in proportion to its “power to persuade.”
 Anti-deference suggests that judges should construe an ambiguous law
against the government, most often but not exclusively in criminal law.
Curtiss-Wright is “super-strong” deference (1011). According to 1936’s
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the executive is “the sole or-
gan of the federal government in the field of international relations.” This
reasoning does not come up in every national security case. But when it
does, the government always wins. That leads to “vigorous dispute” (Ram-
sey 2000, 380), which continues today. The Court most recently mentions
Curtiss-Wright in 2015’s Zivotofsky v. Kerry.
Since Beth-Israel deference addresses treaties, it too relates to interna-
tional relations. Last year in GE v. Outokumpu, the Court mentions an old
deference regime that asks the Court to give “great weight” to executive in-
terpretations of treaties. This evokes its own controversies. Many argue over
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whether to “justify, enhance, or undermine” deference over treaties (Ches-
ney 2007, 1728). But Beth-Israel deference encompasses more than treaties.
Properly understood, Beth-Israel deference is not one deference regime at
all. Eskridge and Baer clump most pre-Chevron regimes into this category.
The regimes apply only in specific fields like labor, immigration, and tax
law.3 Despite applying to different fields, most follow a similar test. They
recommend judges defer to an agency if the agency’s interpretation does not
contravene the ambiguous law’s meaning. Today, most of Beth-Israel def-
erence is “petering out” as Chevron displaces the specific regimes (Eskridge
and Baer 2008, 1108).
Like Beth-Israel deference, anti-deference is not one regime. Instead, it
refers to canons of statutory interpretation when they require judges to in-
terpret an ambiguous law against the government. For some examples, the
government may interpret a statute to apply internationally while the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality suggests the opposite. Or the govern-
ment may interpret a statute such that it disturbs the constitution, which
the canon of constitutional avoidance suggests judges should avoid.4 Most
commonly, the rule of lenity requires that judges interpret ambiguous crimi-
nal statutes in favor of defendants.
It is unclear how the rule of lenity interacts with Chevron. Chevron’s step
zero usually excludes criminal statutes, but not always. When a statute is
ambiguous and includes both civil and criminal penalties—making it “dual-
use”—some courts defer to agency interpretations of the law (Glen and Still-
man 2016, 131), even in criminal cases. Since the rule of lenity “conflicts”
with Chevron when interpreting such statutes (Greenberg 1996, 13), people
disagree over which trumps the other. In the future, the Court may resolve
the disagreement.5
3. This suggests one should treat results about Beth-Israel deference with a degree of
skepticism. The literature does not agree about clumping these deference regimes under
the category. In fact, no other scholarly work explains the category.
4. Examples are plentiful. The category also includes the presumption of scienter, a
canon against rendering sections of a statute “superfluous,” the rule of the last antecedent,
the canon that ambiguous rules governing benefits for veterans and soldiers should favor
them, noscitur a sociis, etc. as long as they require courts disagree with an agency’s
interpretation.
5. They recently duck the disagreement. See Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives 589 US (2020) (Gorsuch, J., statement on the denial of
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Unlike the rule of lenity, the remaining two doctrines connect clearly to
Chevron.
Chevron concerns statutes. Auer concerns regulations. An agency may
write vague regulations, just as Congress writes vague statutes. Auer dictates
that judges should interpret ambiguous regulations as an agency reasonably
does. The practice is longstanding, hailing from 1945’s Bowles v. Semi-
nole Rock. All the same, people debate it today, and the Court’s practice is
changing. 2019’s Kisor v. Wilkie revises Auer into a three-step test, which
is “parallel” to Chevron’s test (Larkin 2020, 108). Some ask the Court to
overrule it (Meisel 2019). Others hope to retain it (Sunstein and Vermeule
2017). It attracts its own empirical research. This study only pays lip service
to Auer, however, when it implicates Chevron. On occasion, it does. Take
Long Island Care v. Coke. When the Court defers to a regulation interpret-
ing the Fair Labor Standards Act under Chevron, it does so by deferring to
the Department of Labor’s interpretation of its own conflicting regulations
under Auer.
Sometimes agencies interpret the law without writing regulations. In
court, they may defend their interpretation by citing informal documents
lacking “the force of law.” These documents no longer merit Chevron defer-
ence. Instead, they may receive Skidmore deference. This standard demands
more from an agency than Chevron does. An agency cannot just reasonably
interpret the law. It must do so persuasively.
Notice “no longer.” During the 1980s, most would describe Skidmore def-
erence as defunct. For fifty years after Chevron’s birth, the Court defers to
agencies under Chevron even when their interpretations lack “the force of
law.”6 Since Chevron demands less and comes at no cost, agencies choose it
over Skidmore.
That all changes in the build up to United States v. Mead Corporation.
certiorari, arguing only Congress can “make an act a crime.”)
6. See, e.g., Nationsbank v. Variable Annuity 513 US 251 (1995) (deferring to an in-
terpretation found in the “Comptroller’s Letter” and “Interpretive Letter No. 494”) and
Young v. Community Nutrition Institute 476 US 974 (1986) (deferring to the FDA’s
“notice” published in the Federal Register).
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Because of Mead, Skidmore fits into the oldest rumors of Chevron’s demise.
Chevron ’s Long-Rumored Demise: Mead and More
Historically, the rumors of Chevron’s demise are greatly exaggerated.
They begin three years after Chevron’s birth. In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
the Court denies the government Chevron deference. A single justice thinks
the majority will doom Chevron. He calls the analysis “unnecessary” and
“erroneous.” According to him, the majority “badly misinterprets Chevron”
by limiting it to only when the Court cannot otherwise interpret a statute. In
his words, such a limitation turns Chevron into a “doctrine of desperation,”
which is “not an interpretation, but an evisceration, of Chevron.”
Because Chevron favors the government, some might expect these words
to come from a liberal. Not so. Those words come from Antonin Scalia. Over
his tenure, he defends Chevron from a Court he believes will kill it. Since
people study Chevron today, it should shock few that Scalia’s predictions do
not come to pass.
Then comes the 1990s and early 2000s, in which the Court chips away
at Chevron’s domain. On one front, Scalia defends Chevron from the Court.
On the other, he leads the charge.
Scalia defends Chevron from every step of “the Mead revolution” (Knud-
sen and Wildermuth 2015, 95). It begins with Skidmore’s incremental and
protracted revival:
 In EEOC v. Arabian Oil, the Court mentions that the government’s
interpretation does not qualify for Chevron and especially “does not
fare well” under Skidmore deference. In response, Scalia calls Skidmore
“an anachronism” from a time before Chevron.
 In Bragdon v. Abbott, the Court remarks that its members “need not
pause” when deciding whether to defer an agency under Chevron. Ig-
noring Chevron, it relies on Skidmore after the agencies demonstrate
“their body of experience and informed judgment.” Scalia is in dissent.
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 In Christensen v. Harris County, the Court adds that interpretations
lacking “the force of law” do not merit Chevron deference. Chevron’s
new step zero excludes “policy statements, agency manuals, and en-
forcement guidelines,” which can still merit Skidmore deference. Scalia
protests. According to him, any “authoritative view” from an agency
should qualify for Chevron. He again calls Skidmore “an anachronism,”
which Chevron’s “watershed decision” replaces. Whenever he makes
these points, he writes alone. Meanwhile, commentators call this a
“seismic shift” against the administrative state (DeLong 2000, 5).
 Finally comes United States v. Mead Corporation. There the Court re-
fuses to defer to the Treasury Department’s ruling letter under Chevron
but not Skidmore. Scalia calls the majority “an avulsive change” to
administrative law. He fears that when the Court “resurrects” Skid-
more, “uncertainty, unpredictability, and endless litigation” will follow.
In short, Mead ’s new continuum of deference will “collapse” Chevron,
“neither sound in principle nor sustainable in practice.”
Years pass. Chevron lives on. People still debate about the Mead rev-
olution. Some argue that it makes Chevron “confusing” and leads to poor
policy outcomes (Bressman 2005, 1447). They compare Mead to Chevron’s
“prolonged, difficult, and confused adolescence” (Weaver 2002, 173). Oth-
ers cheer, arguing Mead makes deference more coherent. Skidmore and
Chevron’s overlap introduces uncertainty for agencies, but that is “a fea-
ture, not a bug” (Matthews 2013, 1354). It reins in agencies’ worst excesses
while preserving regulatory flexibility. This study does not take a stance
on Mead ’s desirability. It does note, however, that Mead limits Chevron’s
domain, maybe dramatically so.
So does Whitman v. American Trucking. Around the same time as
Mead, Whitman shows Scalia narrowing Chevron. Before 2001, academics
and judges make it clear that Chevron has a step two (Merrill 1994, 352).
But until Whitman, the Court never rejects an agency interpretation of a
statute at step two. Perhaps agencies write reasonable statutes until then.
Or maybe the Court shies away from calling a regulation “unreasonable,”
opting instead to call the statute unambiguous. Regardless, the Court be-
haves as if all regulations interpreting an ambiguous statute are reasonable
12
from 1984 to 2001.
That changes in Whitman. Justice Scalia, Chevron’s defender, writes for
an unanimous Court. Even if the Clean Air Act is ambiguous, the Court
reasons, EPA’s regulation defies the statute’s text in an “astonishing,” “un-
lawful,” and most importantly, “unreasonable” way. So begins step two at
the Supreme Court.
As discussed later, these new limits to Chevron coincide with a decline
in the government’s win rate. It is a far cry, however, from the “collapse” of
Chevron. In fact, two following cases expand Chevron’s domain.
Brand X and Arlington
Over the decade following Mead and Whitman, two cases apply Chevron to
peculiar situations.
The first situation occurs when a judge defers under Chevron, but then the
agency forwards a new interpretation. Before National Cable and Telecom-
munications Assocation v. Brand X Internet Services, circuits split on whether
to retain the older agency interpretation for the sake of stare decisis or al-
low agencies to “fill statutory gaps” anew. The majority holds that the new
agency interpretation trumps the old one, as Congressional delegation “does
not depend” on court behavior. The dissent, written again by Justice Scalia,
calls this decision not only “bizarre,” but “probably unconstitutional.” Ac-
cording to him, it creates Article III concerns and continues Mead ’s confusing
approach to the law.
After Brand X, the debate continues. During his tenure on the Court,
Justice Scalia takes every opportunity to complain about the ills of Brand X.
In United States v. Home Concrete and Supply, for example, he complains
that the Court need only mention “the magic words” involved in Chevron
to “(poof!) expand or abridge executive power, and (poof!) enable or dis-
able administrative contradiction of the Supreme Court.” Despite his protest,
Brand X lives on,7 though subject to academic debate (Masur 2007).
7. For the most recent Brand X case, see Encino Motorcars v. Navarro 579 US
(2016) (noting agencies should feel “free to change their existing policies,” but only when
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Putting aside Brand X ’s normative debate, its implication seems clear. It
expands Chevron. If an agency wishes to “flip-flop” its interpretation under
Chevron (Breyer et al. 2017, 336), Brand X enables doing so.
The second situation might be more bizarre. Before Arlington v. FCC,
it was unclear whether judges must defer to an agency’s interpretation of
statutes that govern its own jurisdiction. Academia debates this situation
for years before the Court resolves it (Sales and Adler 2009). Intuitively, ap-
plying Chevron in this way makes some feel that “there is something amiss”
(Breyer et al. 2017, 280). Ignoring that intuition, Arlington holds that agen-
cies can interpret their own jurisdiction. Unlike in Brand X, Scalia writes
for the majority, arguing that no clear line exists between jurisdictional and
non-jurisdictional rules. The dissent responds with a “fundamental” dis-
agreement: the Constitution prohibits applying Chevron as a “weapon” to
expand an agency’s power.
These sections do not focus on Scalia’s opinions to praise his hot takes.
Instead, it does so to expose how one person can desire limiting and ex-
panding Chevron’s domain, all while fearing its death. This desire, joined
by the Court’s countervailing opinions over the years, shows how people can
exaggerate marginal disagreements about Chevron. Consequently, this study
begins expecting to find that the modern rumors of Chevron’s demise are
exaggerated, too. It finds the opposite. Those rumors are discussed next.
Today’s Rumors
The rumors of Chevron’s demise come back with a vengeance.
They begin in academia. Linda Jellum (2007, 730) predicts Chevron’s
“demise,” insisting that the Court cites Chevron less often over time. For
evidence, she cites a paper by Thomas Merrill (1992, 772) finding the Court
decides between “ten and twenty” deference cases per year. Then she com-
pares that to the 2003, 2004, and 2005 terms, where she finds three to five
Chevron cases a year. People still cite this comparison today (Richardson
2021, 37).
the regulation is not “arbitrary and capricious”).
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The comparison is skewed. Merrill’s measure includes other deference
regimes, including Skidmore and Beth-Israel.8 According to Eskridge and
Baer’s database, her count of Chevron cases fits the historical average. If
they did not, she admits that the Court’s shrinking docket could explain the
drop (Jellum 2007, 773). And even supposing the Court does cite Chevron
less often, so what? Fewer citations could suggest the Court treats Chevron
as a closed issue, rather than a dead letter. In conclusion, her argument does
not survive empirical scrutiny, and that explains why her predictions did not
come to pass.
Meanwhile, Jellum and others make qualitative arguments that Chevron
stands on its last leg. Few cite quantitative evidence, and again Chevron
survives for another decade. Chevron’s prognoses miss the mark.
Flash forward to today. Many believe Chevron is “under fire” (McGinnis
2020). They cite conservative opposition to the administrative state, ex-
pecting the Court to curtail the doctrine. They give the Roberts Court the
nickname “Team Death to Chevron by a Thousand Cuts” (Steinberg 2017a).
In this “death by a thousand cuts” (Sharkey 2018, 2412), as the Court ex-
cepts more cases at Chevron’s step zero, the doctrine applies less often. To-
gether, the exceptions construct a “Chevron-ousting package” (Heinzerling
2017, 1962), which can turn the doctrine into a “zombie” (Steinberg 2017b).
Some muse that it “may already be dead” (Johnson 2017, 1287).
Meanwhile, Trump appoints three new justices. With each appointment,
pundits wonder whether this one will finally kill Chevron. They describe
Justice Gorsuch as “one step closer” to overruling it (Bazelon and Posner
2017). They mention Justice Kavanaugh’s potential to “weaken or abandon
Chevron” (Levy 2018). And they accuse Justice Barrett of an “aggressive
pro-business agenda” to “overturn the doctrine in its entirety” (Goodwin
2020).
8. In the 1990-1991 term alone, there are 5 examples. For a Skidmore case, see EEOC
v. Arabian Oil, 499 US 244 (1991). For what Eskridge and Baer call Beth-Israel cases, see
Litton v. NLRB 501 U.S. 190 (1991), Cottage v. Commission 499 U.S. 554 (1991), and
Demarest v. Manspeaker 498 U.S. 184 (1991). For a case that uses the word “deferred”
without referencing deference, see United v. Johnson 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
15
Some rebut these predictions. While acknowledging the doctrine may
face “decline,” they argue “reports of the doctrine’s pending demise” are
“overblown” (Hickman and Bednar 2018, 1397). According to them, Chevron
will survive as long as Congressional delegation continues. This follows from
Congress’ political incentives. Instead of compromising on the minutia of
policies, they delegate those decisions to agencies. And since courts do not
make policy, or at least claim not to, they will permit those delegations.
Altogether, the thousand cuts amount to no more than “weak” limits on
Chevron (Vermeule 2016, 13).
With qualitative evidence alone, this debate is impossible to resolve.
Scholars from both sides editorialize the Court’s latest Chevron cases. From
the same cases, they come to opposing conclusions, talking past each other.
Where some see a cut against Chevron’s domain, others see business as usual.
Checking up on Chevron’s health would demand quantitative evidence.
Some quantitative evidence emerges during this thesis’ writing stage.
Nathan Richardson catalogs the last four years of Chevron cases, finding
that the Court rarely defers. He concludes that “deference is dead at the
Supreme Court” (Richardson 2021, 4). Such a conclusion, however, jumps
the gun.
Confirming such a conclusion requires a reference point. As authors on
both sides conclude, Chevron is less “revolutionary” than people assume
(Herz 2015, 1871), and it “generally” does “not determine case outcomes”
at the Supreme Court (Hickman and Bednar 2018, 1444). Perhaps the last
four years are business as usual. Perhaps they are not. Determining that
requires comparing Chevron’s past to its present. To do so, a study needs
to fill the historical gap between 1984 and 2016. The method for filling that




This study focuses on a subset of Supreme Court cases. To define the sub-
set, this study employs a test. Call it the “population” test. Think of it
like Chevron’s two-step test. At step zero, the cases must correspond with a
Supreme Court opinion. At step one, they must feature the Supreme Court
interpreting a law, be it a statute, treaty, or regulation.9 And at step two,
the government must defend its interpretation of the law, usually in a brief.
Many cases do not meet the population test. At step zero, a few cases
are dismissed every year. At step one, many cases do not discuss a statute,
treaty, or regulation. Instead, they feature state and local law, common
law doctrines, or court-established rules. At step two, the government can
fail to defend its interpretation of the law.10 Failing a step means exclud-
ing a case from the population. Just like a regulation may fail under any
step of Chevron, a case may be thrown out at any step of the population test.
The population test aims to include, not exclude. It captures all Chevron
cases, but not all Chevron-adjacent cases. The phrase “Chevron-adjacent”
refers to a simple and rare situation, wherein a case’s history might relate
to Chevron, but its current controversies do not. For an example, consider
Encino MotorCars, LLC. v. Navarro II. The Court mentions a lower court
deferred under Chevron. It ignores Chevron from then on. In the case’s first
iteration, the Court did not defer to the Department of Labor’s interpretation
of the Fair Labor Standards Act because it stemmed from a “procedurally
9. This equates statutes with statute-equivalent laws. Such an equivalence includes
interstate compacts codified by Congress, see, e.g. Tarrant Regional Water District v.
Herrmann 569 US 614 (2013) (“Congress approved the Compact in 1980, transforming
it into federal law”), and non-self-executing treaties with implementing legislation, see
Medellin v. Texas 552 US 491 (2008) (explaining that treaties “are not domestic law
unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an
intention that it be self-executing”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
10. “Don’t forget the Chevron waiver!” some might exclaim (Rozansky 2018). This
refers to a truly bizarre situation in which an agency axes or even argues against its
interpretation while briefing. The Court has not spoken about this issue. But regardless,
if the government submits a brief that contradicts its earlier interpretation, the database
catches it. Step two only excludes the cases where the agency does not take a position at
all.
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defective” regulation. In the second iteration, Labor declines to submit a
brief or even interpret the law. So the case strikes out at step two of the
population test. Some might fret about this exclusion. But these cases in no
way implicate how the Court defers under Chevron.
In fact, some might instead object that the study includes too many cases.
For example, they may argue that constitutional law cases should not make
it into the database. That argument is misguided for two reasons. First, the
later-discussed Chevron variables subset out these cases. Second, a law does
not exist in a vacuum. For the Court to question a law’s constitutionality, it
must interpret it first. Countless cases suffice as examples, so pick FCC v.
Fox II. There the Court first determines the scope of the FCC’s policy. Then
it decides whether it was unconstitutionally vague. Notice: the regulatory
interpretation precedes applying constitutional rules. If this study excluded
such constitutional law cases—and, indeed, cases with counterintuitive sub-
ject matters generally—it would miss the government’s attempts to defend
its interpretation of the law.
In the end, the test includes around half of the Supreme Court’s cases in
any given term. From the fall of 1983 to the summer of 2005, Eskridge and
Baer code 1014 cases for 156 variables, excluding the original Chevron case.
From the fall of 2005 to the summer of 2020, this study codes 586 cases for
38 variables. Combined, the databases should “consist of all Supreme Court
cases. . . in which a federal agency interpretation of a statute was at issue”
since Chevron was released (Eskridge and Baer 2008, 1094), 1600 in all.11
This study’s breadth erases the “need to conduct significance tests” (Es-
kridge and Baer 2008, 1095). Significance tests evaluate the extent to which
a sample is inconsistent with a particular null hypothesis about a popula-
tion. Here, the “sample” is the population. Consequently, such tests would
be pointless. When the Court changes how often it defers under Chevron,
this study presents such a change through descriptive statistics.
11. The data is hosted at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ZNCKL5.
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The Coding
Not even an eighth of the 1600 cases discuss Chevron. And while Eskridge
and Baer analyze canons other than Chevron, this study does not. It is
therefore necessary to separate Chevron cases from the rest. Fortunately,
Eskridge and Baer’s variable typology has this covered. Each time the Court
so much as mentions Chevron’s name, Eskridge and Baer write it down.
This study mimics their typology. It codes a case for whether its majority
opinion cites Chevron, and then if applicable, it follows the Court’s analysis
at step zero, step one, and step two. Table 1 summarizes these variables, and
an appendix explains them further. Notice that of the 1600 cases passing the
population test, only 180 involve Chevron, including the original case. That
is fewer than one-eighth of statutory and regulatory interpretation cases in
which the government forwards an interpretation of the law. From now on,
this study refers to that near one-eighth as “Chevron cases.”
Variable Eligible Cases Yes
Does the Court cite Chevron? 1600 180
(Citation Check) (11.25%)
Does the Court apply Chevron? 180 126
(Step Zero) (70.00%)
Is the statute ambiguous? 126 80
(Step One) (63.49%)
Is the regulation reasonable? 126 78
(Step Two) (61.90%)
Does the Court defer in Chevron cases? 180 78
(Chevron Deference) (43.33%)
Table 1: Chevron Variables
Reacting to Table 1, some readers wonder whether this study wastes re-
sources. If this study only cares about Chevron, why not code just Chevron
cases? Three responses come to mind. First, such a procedure would not
inspire confidence. Chevron comes up when one may not expect it. With-
out reading all statutory interpretation cases, some Chevron cases could go
unnoticed. Second, this study originally aims to analyze Auer and Skidmore
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deference. That hope is not fulfilled, but it did provide reason to code them
all.12 Third, it enables comparing Chevron cases to statutory and regulatory
interpretation broadly.
Others spot a numerical discrepancy from where step one ends and step
two begins. When an interpretation fails at step one, that should end the
matter. The Court at least insists so. The Court repeats that when Congress
makes its intent known, “that is the end of the matter.” Despite that catch-
phrase, the matter does not always end. Occasionally, the Court issues dicta.
For an example, consider Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. In
Ledbetter ’s eleventh footnote, the Court dunks on the EEOC, and the in-
terpretation fails every step of Chevron. At step zero, the Court does not
consider the EEOC’s Compliance Manual, except for its power to persuade
under Skidmore. At step one, it finds the statute unambiguous. And at step
two, it argues the EEOC’s interpretation would be unreasonable anyway, as
it relies on “misreading” law.
Ledbetter is not one-off. The Court hands down dicta more often than
one might expect. For another example, look at County of Maui v. Hawaii
Wildlife Fund. The Court again refuses to defer at every step. At step zero,
it points out that no party asks for Chevron. At step one, it argues that the
EPA’s arguments conlict with the Clean Air Act’s “structure,” “purposes,”
and “text,” which together make the statute unambiguous. And at step two,
it calls the EPA’s hypothetical interpretation “neither persuasive nor reason-
able.”
One more case deserves a mention. Judulang v. Holder ’s seventh footnote
addresses Chevron. There the Court begins with step two. It clarifies that an
arbitrary and capricious regulation is unreasonable. Then it adds step zero
analysis. Because the BIA’s regulation does not interpret a statute, Chevron
does not apply. At this point, most can distinguish the dicta with ease. The
Court should not have bothered with step two analysis. Without a statute
to interpret, Chevron is irrelevant.
The three cases show that the Court independently analyzes Chevron’s
12. Not a huge loss. After reading them, it did not take much time to code them.
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steps. For that reason, this study cannot ignore the remaining steps when a
regulation fails only one. It codes them independently of each other.
Remember that this study measures how often the Court defers under
Chevron. Formally, the Court defers when and only when it applies Chevron
and the interpretation passes both steps. When Chevron changes over time,
this research design can detect it.
Regardless of whether the Court defers, an agency can still win or lose
a case. So this study has one more important measure: the decision with
respect to the agency. This study refers to this variable as “the decision”
from now on. The decision has three outcomes. The agency wins, loses, or
it receives a “mixed” decision. The appendix again details that further.
Finally, the explanatory variables deserve a paragraph: For decades, the
same men hold the title of Chief Justice. For four- and eight-year periods,
the same President occupies the White House. A quick Google search reveals
the political party in control of the Presidency, the House, and the Senate
in any given year. During each Supreme Court term, one calendar year
passes. Supreme Court opinions mention which agency argued in front of
them. When they do not, the agencies take credit for their own briefs.
Subject matter categorizations originate in the Solicitor General’s Supreme
Court brief database.
The Coding Checks
To maintain cross-database consistency, this study mirrors Eskridge and
Baer’s method in the Continuum of Deference. Their study employs an
individual to code every case. This prevents “coding inconsistencies” that
result from differing opinions (Eskridge and Baer 2008, 1094). This study
entrusts the coding burden to one person as well.
As a coding check, Eskridge and Baer have the non-coding author search
for errors. This study could not afford such a luxury. Instead, this study
employs three alternative coding checks.
The first check employs the same coder at a different time. Months after
the code’s completion, some randomly-selected cases are coded again blind.
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In no case does the coder come to new results. Of course, that coding does
not literally occur blind. Some memory remains. Nonetheless, the second
round of coding should reveal that the first round avoids careless mistakes.
The second coding check employs a different database altogether. Pro-
fessor Nina Mendelson’s Change, Creation, and Unpredictability in Statutory
Interpretation follows the first ten years of the Roberts Court. While it does
not hone in on deference, it “systematically” codes for all canons between the
fall of 2005 and the summer of 2014 (Mendelson 2018, 90).13 The time period
overlaps with two-thirds of this study’s extension. Such overlap verified that
no Chevron cases went unnoticed or miscoded from 2005 through 2014.
The final check fills in for the remaining terms. Professor Nathan Richard-
son’s new article, Deference is Dead (Long Live Chevron) has a table of
Chevron cases from the winter of 2016 to the spring of 2020. Independent
from his influence,14 this study comes to two identical conclusions about
Chevron over the last four years. Conclusion one: fifteen majority opinions
cite Chevron. Conclusion two: the Court defers in only one of those cases,
Cuozzo v. Lee. With those conclusions aligned, this study feels secure about
its coding for the past half-decade.
With these coding checks, one should feel confident while reviewing the
results about Chevron. Not so for the other deference regimes.
Forget About the Other Regimes
The thesis began with grand plans to examine every deference regime from
1983 to the present. These plans did not pan out for two reasons.
The most important is the “the multi-regime problem.” Eskridge and
Baer do not create intermediary variables for deference regimes other than
Chevron. They create one all-encompassing variable, the deference regime
invoked. To their credit, the regime variable is elegant. It categorizes a case
based upon which regime the majority invokes. It has occasional problems,
13. Mendelson groups Skidmore, Chevron, and Auer. But the data includes relevant
quotes from majorities, concurrences, and dissents. The quotes made differentiating the
deference regimes simple.
14. Coding for this study ends in July 2020. His article is public in October.
22
though, when a case involves more than one regime.
To grasp these occasions, follow Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki ’s
majority. There the Court invokes Chevron, Auer, and Skidmore deference,
in that order. It agrees the EEOC can interpret the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act’s ambiguous provisions under Chevron. But the EEOC
does not do so clearly. The EEOC regulations are as ambiguous as the
statute. And so the Court looks to defer to the agency’s interpretation of its
own regulations under Auer. It cannot. The EEOC’s regulations parrot the
statute, disqualifying them from Auer.15 In a Hail Mary, the Court turns to
Skidmore. The EEOC’s informal documents persuasively interpret its own
regulations and the corresponding statute. Finally, the Court agrees with
the EEOC’s interpretation.
Invoking so many regimes, Federal v. Holowecki makes for great case-
book material. Indeed, multi-regime cases are a special occasion. But they
confound the regime variable. For Federal v. Holowecki, three possible en-
tries exist: Auer, Chevron, and Skidmore. Picking one would be arbitrary.
And Eskridge and Baer require just that. Their method codes Federal v.
Holowecki as an Auer case.
This approach sacrifices too much for the sake of elegance. Coding for
only one regime neglects any and all nuance while crediting regimes with
false wins and losses. In Federal v. Holowecki, Eskridge and Baer’s method
credits Auer for the government’s victory. In reality, the Court favors the
government’s interpretation because of Skidmore, not Auer.
Based on the regime variable, Eskridge and Baer (2008, 1142) present
“the precise win rates” of each regime. That presentation is deceptive. At
best, the variable captures incomplete information. With a relatively small
population of deference cases, crediting wins and losses with the wrong regime
creates a case selection problem. Exacerbating this problem, multi-regime
15. Parroting is a longstanding exception to Auer deference, see Gonzales v. Oregon
546 US 243 (2006) (“An agency does not acquire special authority to interpret its own
words when. . . it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language”). Under Auer ’s
new framework, the agency loses at step three for parroting, see Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S.
(2019) (“a court must make an independent inquiry into whether the character and context
of the agency interpretation entitles it to controlling weight”).
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cases can strike at the heart of administrative law, creating precedent for
multiple doctrines at once. For a famous example, recall Mead from the lit-
erature review. While people still disagree about the semantics of whether
it constitutes a “revolution,” few dispute that Mead has an outsized impact
on administrative law.
The multi-regime problem does not apply to Chevron cases, which have
their own variables. So why not create intervening variables for other regimes,
just like for Chevron? Why refrain from going in depth, making multiple vari-
ables for each regime, breaking it down, step by step? Two answers.
First, for some regimes, this would make little sense. Consider Auer. Dur-
ing the 2018-2019 term, the Court reinvents the regime. In Kisor v. Wilkie,
Auer adopts a new three-step framework. Before this, judges did not know
this framework existed, so their opinions did not follow Kisor ’s framework.
The same goes for the other regimes. While Chevron has fit neatly into its
framework, the other regimes have developed messily.
Second, that would require retroactive coding, tripling this study’s re-
search burden. It would require adding new variables for all 586 cases in this
database and redoing Eskridge and Baer’s original 1014 cases.
Ignoring the multi-regime problem, however, presenting findings about
other regimes would still require redoing those original cases. When Es-
kridge and Baer code Chevron cases, they do not misstep. But in cases with
other regimes, coding accuracy suffers.
To illustrate some missteps, one need only look at glance at the Skidmore
case population. Take the first six cases Eskridge and Baer coded as invoking
Skidmore:
1. Regan v. Wald does not invoke Skidmore deference. It instead invokes
Curtiss-Wright.16
16. This should cast doubt on results about Curtiss-Wright deference, too. Eskridge and
Baer claim to track every invocation since 1983, 9 in total, yet miss an obvious one in 1984,
meaning their count should instead total 10. The coding error comes across as strange
when they also code it as a national security case. Still, even counting Regan v. Wald, it
remains true that the government never loses when the majority cites Curtiss-Wright.
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2. Regan v. Time Inc. does not mention, cite, or invoke Skidmore. The
majority does not get closer to Skidmore than merely mentioning a
“compelling Government interest.”17
3. Neither does Cornelius v. NAACP invoke Skidmore. While the gov-
ernment defends its interest in restricting speech, it does so against a
First Amendment challenge.
4. Bennett v. Kentucky Department of Education is also wrong. Again,
Eskridge and Baer code it as a Skidmore case while the Court never
mentions or cites Skidmore. It does, however, cite Chevron deference.
5. Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor yet again
does not cite or mention Skidmore despite coding to the contrary. It is
another First Amendment case.
6. Finally, Eskridge and Baer code one correctly. In Mountain States
Telephone v. Santa Ana, the Court cites, invokes, and relies upon
Skidmore deference.
The illustration does not intend to point fingers at Eskridge and Baer.
Accurately coding over a thousand Supreme Court cases is a monumental
task.18 Still, coding inconsistency should caution one against reading into
the results for regimes other than Chevron.
Finally, some regimes do not have enough cases to analyze. The regime
variable is sobering. Since 1983, the Court invokes Auer a mere 25 times and
Curtiss-Wright a mere 12 times.19 With such small populations, concluding
much from the data seems suspect at best.
Together, these methodological problems caution against extrapolating
the non-Chevron data. Better data could make for fascinating material. But
this study uses what it has: data on Chevron.
17. A keyword in Skidmore cases does arise when the majority clarifies arguments are
not “persuasive.” This, however, refers to Justice Brennan’s arguments in his dissent, not
reasons the government gives defending its interpretation.
18. A monumental task indeed, one that came with frequent errors. See, e.g., Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca 480 US 421 (1987) (citing only
Chevron deference). Eskridge and Baer code this as a Skidmore case, but yet again cor-
rectly identify it in the Chevron variables.
19. If one corrects Regan v. Wald, the number of Curtiss-Wright cases climbs to 13.
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4 Results
Chevron : Not an Automatic Win
Some ask the Court to overrule Chevron. Others hope to see it live another
forty years. At the heart of this dispute, both groups believe that whether
the government wins at the Supreme Court depends on Chevron deference.
Glancing at statistics, that belief seems imprecise. The government fares
worse—not better—in Chevron cases. Table 2 shows that empirical reality.
Subset Cases Wins (%)
Chevron 180 113 (62.77%)
Population 1600 1044 (65.25%)
Table 2: The Decision in Chevron Cases and the Broader Population
Do not take Table 2 to mean that Chevron depresses the government’s
win rate. It does, however, display at a glance that Chevron is far from an
automatic win.
This section does not end with such a glance. Instead, it concentrates
on two situations that arise in Chevron cases. In both, Chevron does not
determine the case’s outcome. Instead, statutory interpretation does.
The first situation is common. In this situation, the Court refuses to de-
fer, and still the government wins. Since 1984, this happens 39 times. Even
after the Court jettisons Chevron, the government fares well. It still wins
38.23% of the cases wherein the Court refuses to defer. The statute can un-
ambiguously support the government’s position. Or the Court can exhaust
other tools of statutory interpretation before turning to Chevron. Either way,
the takeaway remains the same: Chevron is often unimportant in Chevron
cases.
The second situation is rare. In this situation, the Court defers under
Chevron, and yet the government does not win. Either the government re-
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ceives a mixed or disappointing decision. The situation arises three times.20
After the Court defers under Chevron, the government does not lock in its
victory. It can still lose on other matters of statutory interpretation.
Finally come simpler statistics. They are referenced in the variables sec-
tion. Contrary to what some might believe, the Court rarely defers. Across
all cases in which the government interprets the law, the Court mentions
Chevron 11.25% of the time. And after it mentions Chevron, it defers 43.33%
of the time. Put together, the Court defers in only 4.87% of the population.
This all points to a simple conclusion: many expect too much of Chevron.
Its critics and defenders alike pretend Chevron has more power than it does.
That can make the literature “overheated,” veering it “close to nonsense”
(Eskridge and Raso 2010, 1797). Others put it best. At the Supreme Court,
Chevron seems more like a “standard of review” than a mandate (Hickman
and Hahn 2020, 655).
Chevron ’s Death?
From the 1980s to the early 2010s, plenty of people predict Chevron’s death.
Quantitatively, their predictions do not come true. From 1985 to 2015, the
Court defers under Chevron steadily, with some highs and lows. During those
thirty years, the doctrine does not change. They fuss over nothing.
When these people refer to Chevron, they probably mean the “revolu-
tionary” doctrine in the 1983-1984 and 1984-1985 terms (Starr 1986, 283).
Over these two years, Chevron seems unstoppable. In Chevron cases, the
Court defers over and over. In only one does the Court not defer, Bennett
v. Kentucky Education. There the Court mentions it would defer, as long
as the government “later” interprets a statute. During these years, Chevron
appears more powerful because the Court has to demonstrate how it works.
This iteration of Chevron is long dead. Shortly after, the doctrine mellows.
The Court defers between 45 and 50% of the time.
20. Two cases deliver mixed decisions, see K Mart Corporation v. Cartier, Inc. 486 US
281 (1988) and Utility Air v. EPA 573 US 302 (2014). One delivers an outright loss, see
Christopher v. SmithKline 567 US (2012).
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People today, however, have something to fuss about. Table 3 compares
ten-term periods since Chevron’s original decision. It leads to only one con-





1984-1990 40 19 21 47.50%
1991-2000 53 26 27 49.91%
2001-2010 47 21 26 44.68%
2011-2020 40 12 28 30.00%
1984-2020 180 78 102 43.33%
Table 3: Chevron Deference Over Time
The Court defers less often in the 2010s. With a closer look, the trend
becomes sharper. Since the 2014-2015 term begins, the Court hears twenty
Chevron cases and defers only once. Table 4 demonstrates this bad streak. 21
In this streak, the government’s win rate plummets. Recall from Table 3
that the government wins 62.22% of Chevron cases in general. Since 2015,
Table 4 shows the government winning only 30.00% of these cases since 2015.
21. While viewing Table 4, some might object that step zero rejects too many cases.
In this batch, they will name two cases, see FERC v. EPSA 577 US (2016) (stating the
Court “need not address” Chevron after finding FERC’s delegated authority) and Kisor
v. Wilkie 588 US (2019) (using Chevron as a model for Auer ’s new test). A footnote in
the appendix addresses this objection. Eskridge and Baer pick an over-inclusive definition
of step zero, but this study sticks with it. If it calms an objector’s mind, treat the streak





Step 0 Step 1 Step 2
Oneok v. Learjet 2015 No Yes No Loss
Michigan v. EPA 2015 No No Yes No Loss
Mellouli v. Lynch 2015 No No Yes No Loss
King v. Burwell 2015 Yes No Win
Kingdomware v. US 2016 No Yes No Loss
FERC v. EPSA 2016 Yes No Win
Encino v. Navarro 2016 No No Yes No Loss
Cuozzo v Lee 2016 No No No Yes Win
Esquivel v. Sessions 2017 No Yes No Loss
Coventry v. Nevils 2017 No Yes No Win
WI Central v. US 2018 No Yes No Loss
SAS v. Iancu 2018 No Yes No Loss
Pereira v. Sessions 2018 No Yes No Loss
Epic v. Lewis 2018 Yes No Mixed
Digital v. Somers 2018 No Yes No Loss
Sturgeon v. Frost II 2019 No Yes No Win
Smith v. Berryhill 2019 Yes No Win
Kisor v. Wilkie 2019 Yes No Win
Maui v. Hawaii 2020 Yes Yes Yes No Loss
Table 4: Chevron Cases Since the 2014-2015 Term Begins
This study resists the urge to editorialize the trend. Some may interpret
this as Chevron’s death. Others might interpret it as a coincidence. No
one, however, can dispute that the trend is unprecedented. Quantitatively,
Chevron fares worse today than any other time in history.
Of course, the past need not determine the future. Chevron’s fortunes
could reverse. For now, this study considers Chevron’s current decline.
A Step-by-Step Breakdown
Many predict Chevron’s death, but they disagree about which step brings it
on. Some blame a ballooning number of step zero exceptions (Eggert 2017,
704; Sharkey 2018, 2412). Others explain it by the intertwined steps one
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and two, arguing textualist judges see less ambiguity in statutes (Herz 2015,
1887; Jellum 2007, 761). If this study presents Chevron on its death bed,
they will continue to bicker over its diagnosis. To resolve such bickering, this
study devises its own autopsy. Again, the Chevron variables describe the
Court’s behavior at each step. With these variables, this study can evaluate
the competing explanations for Chevron’s decline.
Such an evaluation begins with step zero. Table 5 displays the Court’s
step zero analysis in ten-year periods. This measure defines step zero liber-
ally: either Chevron applies, or it does not. That definition captures all of
the so-called “step zero exceptions” (Levin 2016, 6).
Term Cases Passes (%)
1984-1990 40 33 82.50%
1991-2000 53 37 72.55%
2001-2010 47 30 63.83%
2011-2020 40 26 65.00%
Table 5: Chevron Step Zero Over Time
Looking at Table 5, those decrying the Mead revolution should feel vin-
dicated. They should, however, treat it as a process and not an event. For
the three decades following the original Chevron decision, the proportion of
interpretations passing step zero declines steadily. Mead seems more like a
consequence of this decline, rather than the cause of it.
Those blaming Chevron’s recent decline on step zero, though, find no
vindication here. Frankly, their claims clash with empirical reality.
According to them, step zero “totally undermines” Chevron (Sharkey
2018, 2413). They decry step zero for writing a “delegation fiction” into
Chevron that makes it a “mess” (Eggert 2017, 785). They warn that Chevron
is amid a “radical retreat,” and step zero hosts the “battleground” (Sharkey
2018, 2412).
This is hyperbole. After Mead, step zero barely changes. The Court re-
jects almost an identical number of interpretations at step zero each decade.
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If step zero hosts a battleground, then it does not see battle very often.
Term Cases Passes (%)
1984-1990 33 19 57.58%
1991-2000 37 26 70.27%
2001-2010 33 24 72.72%
2011-2020 29 16 55.17%
Table 6: Chevron Step One Over Time
Step one becomes stricter in the 2010s. Either the Court reviews less
open-ended statutes, or it resolves more legislative ambiguity itself. Either
way, the government does not fare well in making the case that statutes are
ambiguous.
By the numbers alone, the step one in the 2010s resembles the step one
from the 1980s. That is a false resemblance. Keep in mind that the Court
would almost always reject an interpretation at step one during the 1980s.
That contrasts the 2010s, where the Court more frequently rejects interpre-
tations at step zero and step two.
Term Cases Passes (%)
1984-1990 19 19 100.00%
1991-2000 26 26 100.00%
2001-2010 26 21 80.77%
2011-2020 17 12 70.59%
Table 7: Chevron Step Two Over Time
Step two takes a different path from the others. As discussed in the liter-
ature review, the Court does not find a regulation unreasonable in a Chevron
case until Whitman v. American Trucking.
After step two’s debut, it does not change much. Numerically, the Court
rejects exactly 5 interpretations per decade under step two since Whitman.
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That means it is no longer true that the Court “almost never” rejects an
interpretation at step two (Breyer et al. 2017, 256), but Whitman’s impact
is limited. Only the Court’s words change since step two’s introduction. On
occasion, it uses creative language, such as in Mellouli v. Lynch. There it
rejects the BIA’s interpretation for making “scant sense.”
While step two explains some of Chevron’s decline, it does not seem like
a death knell. In fact, no step alone seems like a death knell. Chevron’s
decline over the past few decades seems to come as a consequence of changes
in Chevron at every step, rather than one in particular.
Explaining Chevron ’s Decline
This study cannot explain why Chevron faces decline. It can, however, sug-
gest why the data contravenes some explanations and fits with others. To do
so, it presents some descriptive statistics.
Most explain Chevron’s decline as a consequence of the Court’s changing
sentiment. This explanation lines up with some justices’ recent opinions. In a
turn of events, Justice Thomas, Brand X ’s author, betrays Chevron entirely.
In Michigan v. EPA, he requests that the Court cabin Chevron. According
to him, Chevron enables “unconstitutional delegations.” His request comes
up again last year when he dissents from the Court’s denial of certiorari of
Baldwin v. US. He believes there is “no...justification” for Chevron. He ar-
gues it violates Article III and defies the Administrative Procedures Act. In
those cases, he writes alone, but that is not always so.
Opposing Chevron, Justice Thomas and Justice Gorsuch team up for first
time in PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton Harris Chiropractic. They argue that
Chevron usurps “the legislative power” to write laws and “the judicial power”
to interpret them. They urge the Court to “reconsider” it. A year later, they
make the same case. In a short remark, Thomas’ dissent, joined by Gorsuch,
adds that Chevron “likely violates” the constitution.
Of course, few know exactly what the justices think. Still, if justices
want to defer under Chevron today, their opinion starts two votes down.
This could lead to Chevron avoidance, where the opinion can take “an easier
way out” than Chevron (Bressman 2005, 1464). The way out could mean
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deferring under Skidmore or interpreting the statute by its text alone. Per-
haps justices prefer delivering an outcome over the method to get there. Or
they may want to silence backlash from their colleagues. Either way, recent
years do see fewer Chevron cases than the historical average.
And while only two justices want to overrule Chevron, others may desire
to limit it. While it spotlights Auer, rather than Chevron, Kisor v. Wilkie re-
veals how the Court wants to handle Chevron. The majority—joined by Jus-
tices Kagan, Breyer, Sotomayor, Roberts, and then-Justice Ginsburg—models
Auer deference after Chevron’s two-step framework. The remaining justices
protest, calling for the Court to put Auer out of its misery. After all, they
note, the new framework limits Auer so much that Justice Roberts sees “little
practical difference” between a “zombified” Auer and one “on life support.”
In their final lines, opinions by Justices Kavanaugh, Alito, and Roberts do
not equate overruling Auer with overruling Chevron. They defend Chevron’s
life while advocating for Auer ’s demise.
It is hard to know, however, what Justice Kavanaugh feels. In his time
at the Court, he never defers to an agency under Chevron. Still, he makes
it clear that he does not desire Chevron’s death. In PDR v. Carlton, for
example, he derides the FCC for arguing in favor of “not mere Skidmore
deference or Chevron deference, but absolute deference.” That implies that,
at least on occasion, he would defer under Chevron.
Few know, too, how Justice Barrett feels about Chevron. Some believe
she will lead a “conservative crusade” against it (Overley 2020; Goodwin
2020). Others expect her to accept Chevron (May 2020), just like Justice
Scalia did. Maybe she will end up somewhere in the middle.
To contribute to this conversation, Table 8 details how each Justice votes
in Chevron cases. Its findings do not project the future. Justices can change
their minds. It is implausible but technically possible that Justice Breyer
could vote to overrule the doctrine. And do not treat Table 8 as the be-all
and end-all. All justices sit on a finite number of cases. And the table only
measures whether they do or do not defer. It does not catch their sentiment
about Chevron.
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Table 8 suggests that in the modern era, conservative and liberal jus-
tices alike do not defer often. Most would not expect, for example, that
Justice Sotomayor defers less often than Justice Alito. Perhaps this decade’s
new justices have little opportunity to defer under Chevron. Or maybe they
secretly root for Chevron’s demise along with Justice Gorsuch and Justice
Thomas. Regardless, the point remains: when listing justices in order of least
to most deferential, political ideology alone does determine the order. To the
contrary, Table 8 makes it clear that newer justices, liberal and conservative,
defer less often.
Justice Cases Defers (%) Justice Cases Defers (%)
Burger 16 12 75.00% Marshall 44 19 43.18%
Powell 18 13 73.22% Kennedy 147 63 42.18%
White 55 35 63.63% Alito 54 22 40.74%
Stevens 136 78 57.35% Scalia 143 56 39.16%
Souter 95 53 55.79% Roberts 58 22 37.93%
Ginsburg 118 60 50.85% Kagan 36 14 38.89%
Breyer 107 54 50.47% Sotomayor 36 13 36.11%
Brennan 39 19 48.72% Thomas 128 41 32.03%
Blackmun 60 29 48.33% Gorsuch 10 0 00.00%
O’Connor 114 53 47.37% Kavanaugh 5 0 00.00%
Rehnquist 117 55 47.01%
Table 8: Chevron by Justice
If Chevron’s decline results from justices disliking the doctrine, then ex-
pect the Court to limit Chevron in the years to come. If it does, do not doubt
that people will gossip about Chevron’s demise. In that case, though, they
might have a point. When the Court limits Chevron, circuits will follow. In
turn, agencies have fewer opportunities to deploy Chevron in court. Those
defending Chevron will boo, and their opponents will cheer.
The trend might go beyond Chevron. Some argue that, lately, the Court
disfavors the government more often in general. According to this view, most
“take [it] for granted” that Chevron matters when the Court disagrees with
the government (Epstein and Posner 2018, 833). This has empirical sup-
port. According to Epstein and Posner’s study of all Court cases from 1932
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to 2016, the Court hands down more unfavorable opinions to the President
today than ever.
This study finds the same for statutory and regulatory interpretation.
Across all Court cases in which the government forwards an interpretation
of the law, it finds that the government loses more often today. Table 9
summarizes that data.
Term Cases Wins (%)
1984-1990 349 239 68.48%
1991-2000 434 303 69.81%
2001-2010 409 268 65.53%
2011-2020 409 235 57.34%
Table 9: Court Agreement with Agencies in Statutory and Regulatory Inter-
pretation Cases
Even if the government’s win rate in statutory and regulatory interpre-
tation cases decreases over time, that decrease might not match Chevron’s
decline. To determine if it does, Table 10 shows a similar metric: how often
the government wins in Chevron cases. It reveals that as the government wins
fewer statutory and regulatory interpretation cases, it loses fewer Chevron
cases.
Term Cases Wins (%)
1984-1990 40 27 67.50%
1991-1990 53 38 71.70%
2001-2010 47 28 59.57%
2011-2020 40 20 52.00%
Table 10: Court Agreement with Agencies in Chevron Cases
Since the Court takes so few Chevron cases per decade, the win rates
might not decrease at the same rate. Still, it remains plausible that Chevron’s
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decline emanates not from a hostility to the doctrine, but from judges dis-
agreeing with the government more often in general. The tables neither rule
out that possibility nor prove it so. These tables reveal correlation, not cau-
sation.
Even so, the government’s depressed win rate in statutory and regula-
tory interpretation cases is interesting on its own. It might stumble across a
trend implicating all of administrative law—and more. As the Court deliv-
ers more losses to the government, that can change policy outcomes across
the country. Ignoring the normative implications, though, Table 9 at least
corroborates Epstein and Posner’s findings.
Back to Chevron. Recall that a consensus argues justices treat Chevron
opportunistically. They favor or disfavor government interpretations of the
law not because of Chevron, but because of political ideology. The data offers
a proxy for the interpretation’s political ideology: the political party control-
ling the White House.22 With one exception, however, Chevron’s decline
depends little on who occupies the White House. Back-to-back administra-
tions with opposing political allegiances differ little in how often they win
Chevron cases. In Table 11, it is hard to distinguish Bush I’s win rate from
Clinton’s or Bush II’s win rate from Obama’s.
In the Trump years, the government’s win rate in Chevron cases hits
rock bottom. This outcome might not be political. The Trump administra-
tion frequently ignores administrative law’s “procedural requirements” (Noll
2021, 1). On average, other president’s regulations survive legal challenges
around 70% of the time. But the Trump administration’s regulations survive
less than 20% of the time. The same goes in Chevron cases. While most
presidents win over half of Chevron cases, Trump wins only a quarter.
22. The data includes other proxies, such as which party controls the House and the
Senate. This seems like an unreliable estimate, though, because Congress might write an
ambiguous statute in 2003, and then an agency might not interpret it until 2010. For what
it is worth, the data does not suggest that political control of Congress implicates whether
the government wins in Chevron cases. Eskridge and Baer include another variable—the
political ideology of the interpretation—but it seems too fickle for another person to repli-
cate. This thesis opts against doing so.
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President Cases Wins (%)
Reagan 29 21 77.78%
Bush I 24 16 66.67%
Clinton 42 29 69.05%
Bush II 37 22 59.46%
Obama 36 21 58.33%
Trump 12 3 25.00%
Table 11: Presidential Win Rates in Chevron Cases
Admittedly, Trump’s tenure features fewer Chevron cases in general.
Some of the featured few, though, exemplify the Trump administration’s
failings in administrative law. Take Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis. The
government submits two briefs, one by the Solicitor General and another by
the National Labor Relations Board. Their briefs oppose each other. Ignor-
ing the briefs, the Court interprets what it sees as an unambiguous statute.
Even if the statute was ambiguous, the Court adds, it would not defer under
Chevron. When the government thinks with “two minds,” the Court will not
defer to “garble.”23
Perhaps Chevron’s bad streak will end as the Biden administration begins
filing its paperwork. While Chevron in the Obama years does not look like
the same doctrine from the 1980s and 1990s, it could win more in the coming
years. Historically, the past half-decade may end up as an aberration. Time
will tell.
23. Oddly enough, this decision has precedent supporting it, even if the majority fails to
cite it, see Bowen v. American Hosp. Association 476 US 610 (1986) (mentioning that
“twenty-seven agencies” write regulations about the case’s subject matter, depriving the
Department of Health and Human Services the requisite expertise to interpret the law).
37
5 Conclusion
Employing a database of 1600 cases from 1984 to the present, this thesis cor-
roborates that Chevron’s influence at the Supreme Court is waning. Lately,
the Court defers less often under Chevron, and the government wins fewer
Chevron cases.
This thesis does more than falsify the rumors of Chevron’s demise. It
situates Chevron’s modern iteration in a continuum of deference. By com-
paring the government’s win rate in statutory and regulatory interpretation
cases with and without Chevron, it finds that Chevron does not the tip the
balance. When the Court mentions Chevron in its opinion, that does not
make the government more likely to win.
Comparing Chevron to no deference at all leaves the rest of the contin-
uum unexplored. While this study captures snippets about Skidmore, Auer,
and other regimes, it does not collect credible data about them. With better
research design, another study could explore how other deference regimes in-
fluence the Court. That seems worthwhile, especially for Auer, which Kisor v.
Wilkie overhauls. Over the next decade, researchers could discover whether
Kisor curtails Auer deference. To do so, they might follow Auer from 1945’s
Bowles v. Seminole Rock to the present.
Even without exploring other deference regimes, this thesis helps explain
Chevron’s decline. The Trump administration or the Court could take the
blame. If the Trump administration’s difficulties with administrative law
strike in Chevron cases, then Chevron might rescue itself from its decline
during Biden’s tenure. But if the Court feels hostile toward the government
or Chevron in particular, then Chevron will have some rough years ahead.
Though it might matter little whether Chevron triumphs or withers at
the Supreme Court, Chevron does make an difference at the circuit courts.
If the Court restricts Chevron, circuits might follow the Court’s lead. A
Chevron riddled with holes would not deliver many wins to the government.
Nationwide policy would change, for better or worse.
For a closing remark, return to I’m Just a Bill. After Bill first details his
“long, long wait” in committee, the boy compliments him. “Gee, Bill, you
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certainly have a lot of patience.” Before concluding that Chevron will die and
that statutory interpretation will revert to Schoolhouse Rock! basics, people
should emulate Bill’s patience. Maybe Chevron lays on its death bed now.
Or perhaps Chevron will soon escape a historical anomaly. Statistics do not
suggest one over the other. Over the next few years, people should—and




Chevron Cited: Does the Court mention Chevron?
0 = No
1 = Yes
The Court usually cites Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. But it can pick other cases, such as Mead or Brand X.
Step Zero: Does the Court think Chevron ’s framework applies?
0 = No
1 = Yes
Chevron does not apply in two situations: first, where the Court cites
Chevron and then ignores it; and second, where the Court cites Chevron but
excepts the case at step zero. Eskridge and Baer conglomerate both situa-
tions in this variable, calling it “step zero.” The variable employs a liberal
definition of Chevron’s step zero. In their eyes, the Court either thinks “the
Chevron framework applies,” or it does not (Eskridge and Baer 2008, 1214).
This study does not necessarily endorse that definition. It does, however,
replicate what they provide.








An interpretation does not fail at step 2 until the 2000-2001 term. So un-
til then, the coding presumes that an interpretation meeting step one should
also meet step two. Some might disagree with this characterization of step
two. Fair enough. But Eskridge and Baer code it this way, and this study
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agrees.





0 = No Regime
1 = Anti-Deference
2 = Consultative Deference
3 = Skidmore Deference
4 = Beth-Israel Deference
5 = Chevron Deference
6 = Auer deference
7 = Curtiss-Wright deference
In the regime variable, Eskridge and Baer (2008, 1217) code for only “the
most deferential category,” which is the regime with “the highest number”
in their typology. So in the presence of Auer, Chevron and Skidmore go
unnoticed by the regime variable. Or so they claim.
In practice, they do not. Take Gonzalez v. Oregon. There the Court cites
the three regimes again. This time it discharges the agency’s interpretation
under all of them. It does not defer under Auer because the regulations par-
rot the statute. It does not defer under Chevron because Congress explicitly
limits the Attorney General’s rulemaking authority. And it does not defer
under Skidmore because it finds the executive’s rationale unpersuasive. Most
would assume Eskridge and Baer code this as an Auer case. Not so. They
code it as a Skidmore case. The same discrepancies come up in other multi-
regime cases. Maybe they leave out an important caveat to their procedure.
Or perhaps they make a few mistakes. Without much to go on, this study
codes these situations for the most decisive regime, rather than the strongest
one with a mention. This study emulates what they did, rather than what
they claim they did.
It does not matter. As mentioned, analyzing the regime variable is un-




0 = Favorable Decision
1 = Unfavorable Decision
2 = Mixed Decision
Usually, the Court delivers a simple decision. In those, the majority agrees
or disagrees with the agency’s wishes. Not always. Sometimes the Court rules
“for the agency with regard to some issues and against the agency with re-
gard to others” (Eskridge and Baer 2008, 1213). Those opinions count as a
mixed decision.
Keep in mind that the government can win a case even when the Court
does not adopt the government’s reasoning exactly. The Court may choose
a “narrower rationale” to grant the government’s wish (1213). That still
counts as a win.
Mixed decisions can come up only when cases ask more than one inter-
pretative question. Even in the cases that do, the government usually wins
or loses all of the questions at once.
Though mixed decisions act as a residual category between wins and
losses, this thesis treats mixed and losing decisions the same way. Unless the
government unambiguously wins a case, it counts as a loss for the purposes
of calculating the win rates. For that reason, do not spend too much time
differentiating losing and mixed decisions.
Still, the appendix exists to explain the variable typology, so it presents
two examples.
Recall Epic Systems v. Lewis from the results section. Ignore how
Chevron plays a role in the case. The government could never win. Even
if left to a coin flip, only one agency wins, either the Solicitor General or
the National Labor Relations Board. The other always loses. No matter the
outcome, the decision is mixed.
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Very few cases, however, feature the government dueling itself. For a
more usual example, take Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA. In that case,
the EPA defends two of its interpretations of the Clean Air Act. The Court
accepts only one as reasonable. Without perfect evidence about what the
EPA values more, this case goes into the mixed decision category.24
Identifier Variables
Name
Each case has a shortened name. During and after the 2006 term, the
name mentions both parties of the case. Before the 2006 term, the name
consists of one to three words that Eskridge and Baer chose.
Case Code
Each case has a code. During and after the 2006 term, the code consists
of the case’s term and a number, counting up from the term’s case docket
in reverse-alphabetical order. Before the 2006 term, the code consists of the
case’s term and a number, counting up chronologically.
Control Variables
Term
This refers to the year in which a term begins. In the 2019-2020 term,
for example, that is 2019.
24. Some might argue that the government only cared about the winning interpretation,
so it should not count as a mixed decision. Justice Scalia does proclaim that the Solicitor
General regarded the winning issue as “more important” during oral argument. The
transcript does not support that. The Solicitor General clarifies the first interpretative
question is “not just about the 3 percent,” see Transcript of Oral Argument at 53, Utility
Air Regulatory Group v. EPA 573 US 302 (2014) (No. 121146). And when the Court asks
him about whether the case’s eventual outcome would satisfy the EPA, he repeats “I’m
not endorsing this” multiple times, see Transcript of Oral Argument at 78. Regardless
of how one interprets that oral argument, divining the EPA’s intent from the Solicitor








1 = Bush I
2 = Clinton
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